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Abstract
The judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
in the case of Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname is
noteworthy for a number of reasons. Particularly important
is the Court’s repeated citation and incorporation of various
provisions of the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples into its interpretation of the
American Convention on Human Rights. This aids in greater
understanding of the normative value of the Declaration’s
provisions, particularly when coupled with the dramatic
increase in affirmations of that instrument by UN treaty
bodies, Special Procedures and others. The Court’s analysis
also adds detail and further content to the bare architecture
of the Declaration’s general principles and further contrib-
utes to the crystallisation of the discrete, although still
evolving, body of law upholding indigenous peoples’ rights.
Uptake of the Court’s jurisprudence by domestic tribunals
further contributes to this state of dynamic interplay
between sources and different fields of law.
1 Introduction
On 28 January 2016, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights (the Court) issued its judgment in the
case of the Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname.1 This
case was first submitted to the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights (IACHR) in January 2007 by
eight indigenous peoples’ communities, collectively
comprising the Kaliña and Lokono peoples of the Low-
er Marowijne River. The IACHR adopted a decision on
the merits in July 2013 and, following Suriname’s non-
compliance with its recommended remedial measures,
transmitted the case to the Court in January 2014.2 In its
judgment, the Court held Suriname responsible for vio-
lations of the right to juridical personality, the right to
collective property, political rights, and the right to
1. Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname, IACTHR (2015) Series C, No.
309 (hereinafter Kaliña and Lokono Peoples).
2. Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname, IACHR, Case 12.639, Report
No. 79/13 (2013), available at: <www. oas. org/ en/ iachr/ decisions/
court/ 12639FondoEn. pdf>.
judicial protection, rights all guaranteed under the
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR).3
The Court found that it was ‘an undisputed fact that the
laws of Suriname do not recognize the possibility that
the indigenous peoples may be constituted as legal per-
sons and, consequently, they lack standing to hold col-
lective property titles’.4 It further found that Suriname’s
laws do not provide any legal remedies for the protec-
tion of their collective property rights.5 These conclu-
sions largely restated the findings in its Moiwana Village
v. Suriname and Saramaka People v. Suriname judg-
ments.6 The Court further determined that a series of
activities – bauxite mining, the acquisition of lands by
third parties and the maintenance of nature reserves –
had resulted in additional violations. The Court’s corre-
sponding orders, wholly or partially, respond to the rep-
arations requested by the Kaliña and Lokono and
include a number of significant measures.
The Court, for example, ordered guarantees of non-rep-
etition, requiring that Suriname adopts legislative and
other measures to recognise the rights of all indigenous
and tribal peoples subject to its jurisdiction, measures
not initially requested by the complainants.7 Normally,
such guarantees are employed to address structural
issues affecting human rights beyond those of the
named victims.8 In this regard, the structural nature of
the defects in Suriname law and practice were repeated-
ly highlighted by the IACHR and the Kaliña and Loko-
3. Kaliña and Lokono Peoples, above n. 1, at 305.
4. Id. at 50. See also UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, Access to Justice in the Promotion and Protection of the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, A/HRC/24/50 (2013), at 20 (stating that
‘… the right to self-determination requires recognition of the legal
standing of indigenous peoples as collectives, and of their representa-
tive institutions, to seek redress in appropriate forums. Moreover, in
these cases, remedies must be collective’).
5. Id., at 249 and 268.
6. Moiwana Village v. Suriname, IACTHR (2005) Series C, No. 124; Sara-
maka People v. Suriname, IACTHR (2007) Series C, No. 172 (herein-
after Saramaka People).
7. Kaliña and Lokono Peoples, above n. 1, at 305.
8. See e.g. D.J. Schonsteiner, ‘Dissuasive Measures and the “Society as a
Whole:” A Working Theory of Reparations in the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights’, 23 American University International Law Review
127, 148-9 (2007).
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no in the proceedings before the Court.9 These issues
likewise featured heavily in the 2015 review of Suriname
by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Dis-
crimination.10 The Court was also well aware of Surina-
me’s protracted non-compliance with its prior judg-
ments in Moiwana Village and Saramaka People, and its
concerns in this regard were sharpened by Suriname’s
failure to persuade the Court that it had any intention of
complying.11 The former UN Special Rapporteur on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNSRIP) concluded
that this lack of compliance constitutes a ‘prolonged
condition of international illegality’.12 In this light, the
Court provided a simple explanation for the guarantees
of non-repetition:
[i]n cases such as this one, in which repeated viola-
tions of the human rights of indigenous and tribal
peoples have been committed, the guarantees of non-
repetition acquire greater relevance as a measure of
reparation, so that similar acts are not repeated and
also to contribute to prevention.13
The judgment also favourably clarifies or advances
jurisprudence in some respects. Its treatment of the
rights of indigenous peoples in relation to environmen-
tal protected areas, and associated international environ-
mental law, is especially noteworthy. This had a major
influence on two recent reports on these issues submit-
ted to the UN Human Rights Council.14 The same is
true for its repeated citation of the 2007 UN Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), in some
cases reading its provisions into its interpretation of the
9. ‘IACHR Takes Case involving Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname
to the Inter-American Court’, IACHR Press Release, 4 February 2014
(explaining that there exists ‘a structural problem area involving a lack
of recognition in domestic law of the juridical personality and right to
collective property…’), available at: <www. oas. org/ en/ iachr/ media_
center/ PReleases/ 2014/ 009. asp>.
10. CERD/C/SUR/CO/13-15, (2015), at 21 (observing that indigenous and
tribal peoples suffer from ‘Structural Discrimination’) and; at 22 (recom-
mending that Suriname take ‘all necessary special measures to address
the existing structural discrimination faced by indigenous and tribal peo-
ples…’).
11. Video of Hearing, Kaliña and Lokono Peoples, 4 February 2015, at 1:55
et seq., available at: <https:// vimeo. com/ album/ 3247192/ video/
118766033>, (where Judge García Sayán, ‘echoed’ by Judge Roberto
Caldas, stated that: ‘I must confess my frustration at not finding any
response on the part of the State which would allow me to be optimistic
that the decisions … in this case are going to be fulfilled because what-
ever the Court decides is ultimately going to be left to the State to
implement, and we are going to have a problem which is very similar to
what we saw seven years ago with regard to Saramaka’. He sought
assurances from Suriname so that the Court ‘will actually have firm rea-
son to believe that the State’s statements are not simply a collection of
assertions that are not grounded in reality…’).
12. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
A/HRC/18/35/Add.7 (2011), at 11.
13. Kaliña and Lokono Peoples, above n. 1, at 300.
14. Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, A/71/229 (2016); and Report of the Spe-
cial Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to
the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment,
A/HRC/34/49 (2017). Agreeing with the Court, the Rapporteurs, at 28
and 59, respectively, underscore that respect for indigenous peoples’
rights ‘should be seen as complementary, rather than contradictory, to
environmental protection’.
ACHR and reinforcing the view that various UNDRIP
provisions restate existing law.15 Likewise, the Court’s
references to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights16 are considered by some to have poten-
tially enhanced the development of standards in relation
to the private sector.17 One commentator, for instance,
concludes that the Court’s decision ‘is an encouraging
sign that the UNGPs might yet become more meaning-
ful and less voluntary, and have a life beyond the “soft
law” nursery which raised them’.18
Expert testimony was an important part of the evidence
presented to the Court and clearly influenced some of
its rulings.19 In cases involving indigenous peoples,
anthropologists or historians are often called to give evi-
dence about the specific situation of the claimants, and
their testimony is typically cited to support the Court’s
factual findings20 and, sometimes, reparations.21 The
Court may also allow or request testimony from experts
on particular legal issues and it normally does so when
confronted with issues for the first time or in a new con-
text, or where more detailed consideration appears war-
ranted. In Kaliña and Lokono, two experts testified
about issues of law. Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, the
UNSRIP, testified, inter alia, about the interrelations
between human rights and international environmental
15. See e.g. M. Barelli, ‘The Role of Soft Law in the International Legal Sys-
tem: The Case of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indig-
enous Peoples’, 58 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 957,
at 966 (2009) (explaining that ‘the strong relationship between the
content of the Declaration and existing law should be recognized. The
fact that the Declaration contains provisions that refer to rights and
principles already recognized, or emerging, in the realm of international
human rights, and, more specifically, within the indigenous rights
regime, represents a first important indication of the legal significance
of the instrument’).
16. Kaliña and Lokono Peoples, above n. 1, at 224 (citing UN Guiding Prin-
ciples on Business and Human Rights, Principle 1); and 225 (citing UN
Doc. A/HRC/17/31, 18, concerning human rights due diligence by a
business enterprise and stating that this ‘indicates that businesses must
respect the human rights of … indigenous and tribal peoples, and pay
special attention when such rights are violated’).
17. A. Gonza, ‘Integrating Business and Human Rights in the Inter-Ameri-
can Human Rights System’, 1 Business and Human Rights Journal 357
(2016); and A. Mondragón, ‘Corporate Impunity for Human Rights Vio-
lations in the Americas: The Inter-American System of Human Rights as
an Opportunity for Victims to Achieve Justice’, 57 Harvard International
Law Journal 53, at 56 (2016) (explaining that ‘[t]his is the first case in
which the Court “takes note” of the Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights,’ and, however, correctly observing that the Court has
not used ‘opportunities to develop specific state duties with regard to
corporations acting in their jurisdiction. The recent judgment of the I/A
Court in [Kaliña and Lokono Peoples] illustrates this lack of analysis’).
18. C. Esdaile, ‘Whilst We Wait for a Binding Treaty, Court Endorses UN
Guiding Principles’, Lexology, 7 March 2016, available at: <https://
www. lexology. com/ library/ detail. aspx ?g= 7ec1f0fb -405e -4e1d -b7c9
-94add086884a>.
19. See e.g. Kaliña and Lokono Peoples, above n. 1, at 174-5.
20. See R. Price, Rainforest Warriors: Human Rights on Trial (2011) (pro-
viding an extensive analysis of Saramaka People v. Suriname from the
perspective of an anthropologist expert witness); and S. Kirsch, Engaged
Anthropology: Politics Beyond the Text (2018), Ch. 7 (discussing his
role as an expert witness, by affidavit, in Kaliña and Lokono Peoples,
above n. 1).
21. See e.g. G. Citroni and K. Quintana, ‘Reparations for Indigenous Peo-
ples in the Case Law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, in
F. Lenzini (ed.), Reparations for Indigenous Peoples: International and
Comparative Perspectives (2008).
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law. Jérémie Gilbert testified, inter alia, about restitu-
tion of lands, including in the context of environmental
conservation. In their oral testimony, both experts high-
lighted various provisions of the UNDRIP.
This article looks primarily at how the Court’s judg-
ment in Kaliña and Lokono references or otherwise
incorporates provisions of the UNDRIP. This includes
an analysis of the extent to which the Court’s reasoning
and rulings track or diverge from the standards set
therein. It concludes that there is substantial conver-
gence: an unsurprising conclusion in some ways consid-
ering that the UNDRIP itself was the result of a process
that mostly memorialised existing and emerging indige-
nous rights norms, including as derived from the
Court’s jurisprudence. Nonetheless, there is evidence
that the UNDRIP itself is influencing the further devel-
opment of standards in the inter-American system – and
beyond, for example, given the influence of the Court’s
jurisprudence in the African system22 – blurring the dis-
tinction between ‘soft’ and ‘binding’ law, and intensify-
ing the interrelationship between indigenous rights in
universal and regional human rights law.23 This also
illustrates, inter alia, the importance of strategic litiga-
tion as a means of further developing indigenous rights
standards, including by elaborating on and amplifying
UNDRIP provisions and their application.24 The latter
may become even more relevant given the expansion of
the mandate of the UN Expert Mechanism on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples: ‘to achieve the ends of the
Declaration through the promotion, protection and ful-
filment of the rights of indigenous peoples;’ and to
‘[p]repare an annual study on the status on the rights of
indigenous peoples worldwide in the achievement of the
ends of the Declaration…’.25
2 Kaliña and Lokono Peoples
and UNDRIP
2.1 Citation, Coherence and Incorporation
In its 2007 Saramaka People judgment, the Court was
the first international human rights tribunal to specifi-
cally cite the UNDRIP,26 a move welcomed shortly
thereafter by the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous
22. See e.g. Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights, No. 276/2003 (2010) (extensively citing
Saramaka People).
23. See e.g. M. Barelli, ‘The Interplay Between Global and Regional Human
Rights Systems in the Construction of the Indigenous Rights’, 32
Human Rights Quarterly 951 (2010).
24. See also C. Baldwin and C. Morel, ‘Using the United Nations Declara-
tion on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Litigation’, in S. Allen and A.
Xanthaki (eds.), Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (2011).
25. Human Rights Council, A/HRC/33/L.25, 26 September 2016, at 1 and
2(a).
26. Saramaka People, above n. 22, at 131 (quoting UNDRIP, Art. 32(2)).
See also L. Rodriguez-Pinero, ‘The Inter-American System and the UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Mutual Reinforce-
ment’, in S. Allen and A. Xanthaki (eds.), Reflections on the UN Decla-
ration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2011) (reviewing the influ-
Issues.27 While it has done so to some extent in other
cases since then, most notably Sarayaku v. Ecuador,28 in
Kaliña and Lokono Peoples it extensively references,
tracks and even incorporates provisions of the UNDRIP
into its interpretation of state obligations in the
ACHR.29 This attention may be attributed in part to
widespread reference to the UNDRIP and interrelated
law in pleadings submitted by the Kaliña and Lokono
and the expert testimony rendered before the Court,
whereas arguments submitted in prior cases focused
especially on ILO Convention No. 169, an instrument
in force for all but one of the respondent states. Irre-
spective, the Court’s reliance on the UNDRIP fortifies
already persuasive arguments about the legal stature of
many of its provisions – in part based on their coherence
with interpretations of binding instruments – and fur-
ther concretises the body of law confirming and protect-
ing indigenous peoples’ rights.30 The same may be said
for the (too numerous to cite here) explosion of referen-
ces to and endorsements of the UNDRIP by UN treaty
bodies and Special Procedures of the Human Rights
Council.31 Some of them even call on states to ‘comply’
with the UNDRIP and incorporate it into domestic
law,32 including, in one instance, Suriname.33 The
majority view holds that the UNDRIP in toto is, at a
bare minimum, an authoritative ‘guide’ by which to
ence of the UNDRIP, including in its draft form, in the inter-American
system).
27. ‘Permanent Forum Hails General Assembly Adoption of Indigenous
Rights Declaration’, available at: <www. un. org/ News/ Press/ docs/ 2008/
hr4953. doc. htm>.
28. See e.g. Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, IACTHR
(2012) Series C, No. 245, 201, 215 and 217 (hereinafter Sarayaku).
29. See e.g. Kaliña and Lokono Peoples, above n. 1, at 139 (citing and
quoting UNDRIP, Art. 26); 180 (quoting Arts. 18, 25 and 29 and citing
Art. 23); 202 (quoting Arts. 18, and 32(2)); 221 (citing Art. 32(3)); 231
(citing Art. 12); 251(3) (citing the fifth preambular paragraph and Art.
2); 251(5) (citing Arts. 27 and 33(2)); 296 citing UNDRIP, Art. 29); Par-
tially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Alberto Pérez Pérez (citing Arts. 18
and 32); and Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Humberto Antonio
Sierra Porto and Eduardo Ferrer MacGregor Poisot (citing Arts. 18, 29
and 32).
30. See e.g. M. Åhrén, Indigenous Peoples’ Status in the International Legal
System (2016), 103-7.
31. See e.g. F. MacKay (ed.), Indigenous Peoples and United Nations
Human Rights Bodies: A Compilation of UN Treaty Body Jurispru-
dence, Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, and the
Advice of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
Vols. VI-VII (covering the years 2013-16), available at: <https:// www.
forestpeoples. org/ en/ legal -human -rights -human -rights -mechanisms -un
-human -rights -system -guides -human -rights -mechanisms>.
32. See e.g. E/C.12/UGA/CO/1 (2015), at 13 (recommending that Uganda
includes ‘recognition of indigenous peoples in the Constitution in line
with the [UNDRIP]’); CRC/C/GAB/CO/2 (2016), at 61(a) (calling on
Gabon to ‘[a]dopt a law for the protection of indigenous people based
on the [UNDRIP]’); and CEDAW/C/BOL/CO/5-6 (2015), at 25(c) (rec-
ommending that Bolivia ‘[e]nsure[s] that indigenous women have
access to education in compliance with the criteria enshrined in the
[UNDRIP]’).
33. CERD/C/SUR/CO/13-15, above n. 10, at 24 (reiterating ‘its recom-
mendation concerning the drawing up of a framework law on the rights
of indigenous and tribal peoples’, and ‘that this framework law comply
with the provisions of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples’).
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interpret state obligations under various human rights
instruments.34
The preceding is most clearly illustrated in the Court’s
treatment of property and participation rights pursuant
to Articles 21 and 23 of the ACHR, respectively, in
Kaliña and Lokono Peoples. The Court’s reparations
orders are also instructive. In its judgment, the Court
reiterated its findings in Saramaka People that ‘the
domestic laws of Suriname do not recognize the [indige-
nous peoples’] right to communal property…’,35 and
that this right must be read together with the right to
self-determination.36 The Court concluded that ‘the
Kaliña and Lokono are protected by international
human rights law which guarantees the right to the col-
lective territory …; [and] the State has the obligation to
adopt special measures to recognize, respect, protect
and guarantee’ this right.37 Referring to its prior juris-
prudence,38 it explained, inter alia, that the state must:
‘ensure the effective ownership of the indigenous peo-
ples and refrain from taking steps that could lead to
State agents, or third parties acting with their acquies-
cence or tolerance, adversely affecting the existence, val-
ue, use or enjoyment of their territory’; ‘ensure the right
of the indigenous peoples to control and to own their
territory without any type of outside interference by
third parties’; and ‘ensure the right of the indigenous
and tribal peoples to control and to use their territory
and natural resources’.39
34. See e.g. CERD/C/USA/CO/6 (2008), at 29 (recommending that the
USA employs the UNDRIP ‘as a guide to interpret [its’] … obligations …
relating to indigenous peoples’); and Committee on the Rights of the
Child, General Recommendation No. 11, Indigenous Children and their
Rights under the Convention (2009), 82.
35. Kaliña and Lokono Peoples, above n. 1, at 122.
36. Id. (further explaining that by virtue of the right to self-determination,
indigenous peoples may ‘freely pursue their economic, social and cultur-
al development’ and may ‘freely dispose of their natural wealth and
resources’ to ensure that they are not ‘deprived of [their] own means of
subsistence;’) and, at 123, (that this ‘supports an interpretation of Arti-
cle 21 of the American Convention that requires recognition of the right
of the members of indigenous and tribal peoples to freely determine
and enjoy their own social, cultural and economic development, which
includes the right to enjoy their particular spiritual relationship with the
territory they have traditionally used and occupied’). See also P. Mack-
lem, The Sovereignty of Human Rights (2015), at 48 (explaining that
‘indigenous peoples have rights of internal self-determination, which
entitle them to extensive protection associated with their identities, cul-
tures, territories, and forms of governance’).
37. Id., at 125.
38. Id., at 131-2.
39. Id., at 132 (citing Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community Case v.
Nicaragua, IACTHR (2001) Series C, No. 79; Saramaka People, above n.
22; and Sarayaku, above n. 28) (footnotes omitted).
40. The IACHR and the Court have previously equated control over territo-
ry with indigenous peoples’ survival, development and the pursuit of
their aspirations. Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States of America,
IACHR (2002), Case 11.140, Report 75/02, at 128 (observing that
‘continued utilization of traditional collective systems for the control and
use of territory are in many instances essential to … the survival of
indigenous peoples’); and Yakye Axa v. Paraguay, IACTHR (2005) Ser-
ies C, No. 125, at 146 (observing that ‘indigenous territorial rights
encompass a broader and different concept that relates to the collective
right to survival as an organized people, with control over their habitat
The Court first emphasised the ‘control’ aspect of
indigenous property rights40 in Saramaka People,41 relat-
ing it to the territorial/resource sovereignty aspect of
the right to self-determination.42 It includes various
aspects of self-government,43 including indigenous peo-
ples’ rights to internally regulate and manage territory
and to freely determine and enjoy their own social, cul-
tural and economic development, all through their own
institutions and procedures.44 UNDRIP, Article 26(2),
also recognises this right, providing in pertinent part
that ‘Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use,
develop and control’ their traditional lands, territories
and resources. Note in this context also that in Chitay
Nech, the Court observed that the direct representation
of indigenous peoples, through their mandated repre-
sentatives and institutions, is ‘a necessary prerequisite’
for the exercise of their right to self-determination…’.45
The Court further explained in Kaliña and Lokono Peo-
ples that, ‘based on the principle of legal certainty’,
indigenous peoples’ land rights ‘must be formalized by
the adoption of the administrative and legislative meas-
ures required to create an effective mechanism for
delimitation, demarcation and the granting of titles that
as a necessary condition for reproduction of their culture, for their own
development and to carry out their life aspirations’).
41. Saramaka People, above n. 22, at 115 (observing that Suriname’s ‘legal
framework … does not guarantee the right to effectively control their
territory without outside interference’); and, at 194 (ordering that rec-
ognition of the Saramaka people’s ‘right to manage, distribute, and
effectively control such territory, in accordance with their customary
laws and traditional collective land tenure system’); Saramaka People v.
Suriname, IACTHR (2008) Series C, No. 185, 48-50; accord Apirana
Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand, (Communication No. 547/1993),
CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993 (2000), at 9.7 (explaining that a conjunctive
reading of Arts. 1 and 27 of the Covenant implies that indigenous peo-
ples have a right to enjoy ‘effective possession’ of and ‘effective control’
over natural resources).
42. Since 2013, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
routinely addresses indigenous territorial and associated rights under
Art. 1 of the Covenant. See e.g. E/C.12/PRY/CO/4 (2015), at 6
(expressing concern that Paraguay ‘has not yet legally recognized the
right of indigenous peoples to dispose freely of their natural wealth and
resources or put in place an effective mechanism to enable them to
claim their ancestral lands (art. 1)’). Identical or similar language is
found in 2015-16 reviews of Chile, Thailand, Uganda, Venezuela,
Guyana, Kenya, Namibia, Canada, Honduras, Sweden, and Costa Rica.
43. Kaliña and Lokono Peoples, above n. 1, at 124. See also Kuna Indige-
nous Peoples of Madungandi and Embera Indigenous People of Bayano
v. Panama, IACHR (2012), Case 12.354, Report 125/12, at 259 (attrib-
uting positive value to the establishment of a legal mechanism for rec-
ognition of collective property rights and stating that ‘it understands
that the mechanism cannot exclude rights of indigenous peoples that
are associated mainly with the right to self-government according to
their traditional uses and customs…’).
44. See e.g. UNDRIP, Arts. 3, 4, 5, 20(1), 23, 26(2) and 32(1).
45. Chitay Nech v. Guatemala, IACTHR (2010) Series C, No. 212, at 113
(also observing, at 115, that indigenous leaders ‘exercise their charge by
mandate or designation and in representation of a community. This
duality is both the right of the individual to exercise the mandate or
designation (direct participation) as well as the right of the community
to be represented. In this sense, the violation of the first reverberates in
the damage of the other right’). See also CERD/C/CRI/CO/19-22
(2015), at 25 (expressing concern that local government bodies in Cos-
ta Rica ‘have supplanted indigenous peoples’ own institutions in their
relations with the State…;’ and recommending ‘that indigenous peo-
ples’ authorities and representative institutions be recognized in a man-
ner consistent with their right to self-determination in matters relating
to their internal and local affairs’).
34
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recognizes these rights in the practice’.46 It elaborated
again, stating that indigenous peoples’ right to property
‘includes full guarantees over the territories they have
traditionally owned, occupied and used in order to
ensure their particular way of life, and their subsistence,
traditions, culture, and development as peoples’.47
The language ‘full guarantees over the territories they
have traditionally owned, occupied and used’, should be
understood in the following way. Citing, tracking the
structure of, and expounding on the general principles
employed in the UNDRIP,48 the Court ruled that the
state is obligated to:49
1. delimit the territory traditionally owned by the Kali-
ña and Lokono,50 which, ‘in turn, implies establish-
ing borders and boundaries, as well as its size’.51 The
term ‘traditionally owned’ should be understood in
relation to their traditional tenure system and related
customary laws, which must be respected;52 as must
their ‘distinctive spiritual relationship’ with their
‘lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and other
resources’53 and, more broadly, the profound rela-
tionship between indigenous lands and cultural iden-
tity and integrity;54
2. those areas of territory traditionally owned which are
currently possessed by them automatically become
subject to their ownership, control and other rights;55
3. those areas within the delimited territory not current-
ly possessed (e.g. in the possession of a third party,
nature reserves or concessions), but nonetheless sub-
46. Kaliña and Lokono Peoples, above n. 1, at 133.
47. Id., at 139.
48. Id., footnote 178, where the Court cites UNDRIP, Art. 26, and states
that ‘Similarly, [that article] recognizes the right to lands, territories and
resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise
used or acquired, as well as the right to own, use, develop and control
these lands; thus, States must give legal recognition and protection to
these lands, respecting the customs, traditions and land tenure systems
of the indigenous peoples concerned’. See also Yakye Axa v. Paraguay,
IACTHR (2006) Series C, No. 142, at 34 (containing a similar process).
49. Id., at 125 (‘the State has the obligation to adopt special measures to
recognize, respect, protect and guarantee … the right to communal
ownership of this territory’).
50. UNDRIP, Art. 26(1), providing that ‘Indigenous peoples have the right
to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally
owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired’.
51. Yakye Axa v. Paraguay, above n. 48, at 34.
52. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni, above n. 39, 164 (‘the State must adopt
the legislative, administrative, and any other measures required to cre-
ate an effective mechanism for delimitation, demarcation, and titling of
the property of indigenous communities, in accordance with their cus-
tomary law, values, customs and mores’).
53. UNDRIP, Art. 25; accord Kaliña and Lokono Peoples, above n. 1, 124;
and Saramaka People, above n. 22, at 95.
54. See e.g. Rio Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, IACTHR (2012), Series C,
No. 250, at 160 (where the Court explained that it ‘has already indica-
ted that the special relationship of the indigenous peoples with their
ancestral lands is not merely because they constitute their main means
of subsistence, but also because they are an integral part of their cos-
movision, religious beliefs and, consequently, their cultural identity or
integrity, which is a fundamental and collect right of the indigenous
communities that must be respected…’) (footnotes omitted).
55. UNDRIP, Art. 26(2), providing that ‘Indigenous peoples have the right
to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources
that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional
occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired’
(emphasis added).
ject to the Kaliña and Lokono’s property rights and
associated guarantees, require formal assessment56 – a
weighing and balancing of rights or interests by the
state57 – to determine if they should be returned to
the Kaliña and Lokono (restitution) or whether an
alternative remedy is required (e.g. compensation,
benefit sharing, provision of alternative lands, or rev-
ocation of concessions);58 and
4. the state must legally recognise, demarcate and title
the full extent of the lands, territory and resources59
that result from this process, in which the indigenous
peoples must participate, and further guarantee the
Kaliña and Lokono the ‘full and equal exercise’60 of
their right to these lands, and their effective control
over and use and enjoyment61 of the same.62
UNDRIP was again employed explicitly by the Court in
relation to the political participation rights guaranteed
by Article 23 of the ACHR.63 In particular, it directly
read Article 18 of the UNDRIP into its interpretation of
Article 23, collectivising the right as it applies to indige-
nous peoples in the process. Noting the relationship
with collective property rights, the Court ruled that the
state must establish mechanisms for effective participa-
tion: ‘[t]his is not only a matter of public interest, but
56. Id., Art. 27 (‘States shall establish and implement, in conjunction with
indigenous peoples concerned, a fair, independent, impartial, open and
transparent process, giving due recognition to indigenous peoples’ laws,
traditions, customs and land tenure systems, to recognize and adjudi-
cate the rights of indigenous peoples pertaining to their lands, territories
and resources, including those which were traditionally owned or other-
wise occupied or used. Indigenous peoples shall have the right to partic-
ipate in this process’).
57. Kaliña and Lokono Peoples, above n. 1, at 155 (where the Court holds
that this involves assessing, on a case by case basis, ‘the legality, neces-
sity, proportionality and attainment of a legitimate objective in a demo-
cratic society … in order to restrict the right to property, on the one
hand, or the right to traditional lands, on the other, without the restric-
tion of the latter preventing the survival of the members of the indige-
nous communities as a people’).
58. UNDRIP, Art. 28 (providing that ‘(1) Indigenous peoples have the right
to redress, by means that can include restitution or, when this is not
possible, just, fair and equitable compensation, for the lands, territories
and resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occu-
pied or used, and which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used
or damaged without their free, prior and informed consent. (2) Unless
otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned, compensation
shall take the form of lands, territories and resources equal in quality,
size and legal status or of monetary compensation or other appropriate
redress’).
59. See e.g. Sarayaku, above n. 28, at 148 (stating that ‘the right to use
and enjoy the territory would be meaningless for indigenous and tribal
communities if that right were not connected to the protection of natu-
ral resources in the territory’).
60. Id., at 171.
61. Kaliña and Lokono Peoples, above n. 1, at 136. See also Kuna and
Emberá Indigenous Peoples v. Panama. IACTHR (2014) Series C, No.
284, at 142 (stating that ‘by granting these lands to indigenous peo-
ples, the State acquires the duty of ensuring the effective enjoyment of
the right to property’).
62. UNDRIP, Art. 26(3), providing that ‘States shall give legal recognition
and protection to these lands, territories and resources. Such recogni-
tion shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and
land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned’.
63. Art. 23 of the ACHR provides, in pertinent, part that ‘[e]very citizen
shall enjoy the following rights and opportunities: (a) to take part in the
conduct of public affairs…’.
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also forms part of the exercise of [indigenous peoples’]
right to take part in any decision-making on matters that
affect their interests, in accordance with their own pro-
cedures and institutions…’.64 This was applied in rela-
tion to the exploitation of resources and conservation of
the environment via nature reserves.65 It should be
noted that this is not the first occasion that the Court
has read so-called soft law into its interpretation of the
ACHR’s guarantees. In Moiwana Village, for instance,
the Court essentially read many of the UN Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement66 into its interpreta-
tion of state obligations under Article 22 of the ACHR
(on freedom of movement)67
With respect to the nature reserves in the territory of
the Kaliña and Lokono, the Court further ruled that it is
necessary to:
recognize the right of the indigenous peoples to use
their own institutions and representatives to manage,
administer and protect their traditional territories …
[and;] seek agreements between the respective com-
munities and the conservation agencies that establish
the management, the commitments, the responsibili-
ties, and the purposes of the area….68
The Court also cited UNDRIP, Article 12, to hold that,
in the nature reserves, states should ‘accede to [indige-
nous peoples’] traditional health system and other socio-
cultural functions, and preserve their way of life, cus-
toms and language, as well as to accede to, maintain and
protect their religious and cultural sites’.69 Additionally,
traditional practices that ‘contribute to the sustainable
care and protection of the environment should be main-
tained, protected and promoted;’ it is, therefore, ‘perti-
nent to support the indigenous peoples’ knowledge,
institutions, practices, strategies and management plans
related to conservation’.70 This is consistent with
UNDRIP, Article 29(1), which provides, in part, that
64. Kaliña and Lokono Peoples, above n. 1, at 203. UNDRIP, Art. 18 pro-
vides that ‘Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-
making in matters which would affect their rights, through representa-
tives chosen by themselves in accordance with their own procedures, as
well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous decision-making
institutions’.
65. Id., at 196 (quoting UNDRIP, Art. 18, and ruling that ‘the participation
of the indigenous communities in the conservation of the environment
is not only a matter of public interest, but also part of the exercise of
their right as indigenous peoples “to participate in decision-making in
matters which would affect their rights, […] in accordance with their
own procedures and […] institutions”’).
66. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (1998).
67. Moiwana Village v. Suriname, above n. 6, at 111 (holding that the
many of the Guiding Principles ‘illuminate the reach and content of
Article 22 … in the context of forced displacement’ and emphasizing
that ‘States are under a particular obligation to protect against the dis-
placement of indigenous peoples … and other groups with a special
dependency on and attachment to their lands’).
68. Kaliña and Lokono Peoples, above n. 1, at footnote 230.
69. Id., at footnote 231 (also citing Decisions adopted by the Conference of
the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at its twelfth meet-
ing, e.g. Decision XII/12, 8-9). See also Sarayaku, above n. 28, at 146-7
(highlighting the relationship between land rights and ‘traditional
medicinal systems and other socio-cultural functions’).
70. Id.
indigenous peoples have a right to conservation and pro-
tection of the environment and the productive capacity
of their lands, and states ‘shall establish and implement
assistance programmes’ to support the same.
Locating indigenous participation rights in Article 23 of
ACHR is not new in the inter-American human rights
system.71 Nonetheless, two of the judges considered that
Kaliña and Lokono Peoples represented an innovation in
its case law in this respect, even if, to observers at least,
the significance is not readily apparent.72 Previously, the
Court had only narrowly applied that article to indige-
nous participation (in Nicaragua’s electoral system and,
on an individual basis, to the forced disappearance of a
prominent indigenous leader in Guatemala),73 and it
had explicitly refused to apply it to indigenous land-
related issues on one prior occasion.74 Instead, the Court
has repeatedly grounded participation rights in the right
to property, a right that is subject to an express and
broad subordination clause when the state asserts a pub-
lic interest.75 It mitigated this somewhat in Saramaka
People and its progeny76 by requiring, inter alia, effec-
tive participation, and consent in some circumstances,
in relation to proposed subordinations under Article 21,
so it is unlikely that this explains where the innovation
lies.77 Article 23, on the other hand, allows for the regu-
lation, not subordination, of political rights on specified
grounds, which do not include the public interest as
such.78 This may be one reason why Judge Pérez Pérez
deemed it to have a ‘very different meaning and content’
from the participation rights under Article 21.79
71. See e.g. IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador.
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.96, Doc. 10 rev. 1 (1997).
72. Joint Concurring Opinion, Sierra Porto and Ferrer Mac-Gregor Poisot,
above n. 29, at 21 (observing that the reference to Art. 23 and the right
to effective participation more generally constitute ‘developments in the
Court’s case law…’).
73. Yatama v. Nicaragua, IACTHR (2005) Series C, No. 127; and Chitay
Nech v. Guatemala, above n. 45.
74. Sarayaku, above n. 28, at 230 (declining to address an alleged violation
of Art. 23 on the basis that ‘the facts have been sufficiently analyzed
and the violations conceptualized … in the terms of Article 21 of the
Convention…’).
75. Art. 21 provides, in part, that ‘1. Everyone has the right to the use and
enjoyment of his property. The law may subordinate such use and
enjoyment to the interest of society. 2. No one shall be deprived of his
property except upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of
public utility or social interest, and in the cases and according to the
forms established by law’.
76. See T. Antkowiak, ‘Rights, Resources and Rhetoric: Indigenous Peoples
and the Inter-American Court’, 35 University of Pennsylvania Journal
of International Law 113 (2013) (commenting on, inter alia, the limita-
tions of the right to property as a guarantee for the complex of indige-
nous rights addressed by the Court, particularly in light of the wide
powers to limit property rights, and concluding that, while the Court
has attempted to mitigate this by creating special safeguards for indige-
nous lands and resources, these safeguards have proved to be inade-
quate).
77. Saramaka People, above n. 22, at 129-34.
78. Art. 23(2) provides that ‘The law may regulate the exercise of the rights
and opportunities referred to in the preceding paragraph only on the
basis of age, nationality, residence, language, education, civil and men-
tal capacity, or sentencing by a competent court in criminal proceed-
ings’.
79. Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pérez Pérez, above n. 29, at
20(g).
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A more likely explanation, however, lies in both the
Court’s prior case law and its adaptation in Kaliña and
Lokono. First, in Yakye Axa, the Court held that respect
for indigenous peoples’ rights is a vitally important –
and countervailing – public interest in its own right.80
In Kaliña and Lokono, it went a step further, ruling that
effective participation by indigenous peoples in deci-
sion-making is itself integral to establishing the legiti-
macy of a public interest declaration as well as a right
that must be respected in general.81 It is important to
note that this line of analysis is not confined only to
international human rights bodies.82 For example, the
Canadian Supreme Court observed in relation to lack of
consultation around the granting of oil and gas permits
that a ‘project authorization that breaches the constitu-
tionally protected rights of Indigenous peoples cannot
serve the public interest’.83 It would appear, therefore,
that the Court is holding that states must ensure indige-
nous participation and fully account for the separate and
countervailing public interest of respecting indigenous
peoples’ rights from the outset, and as part of determin-
ing the public interest per se, and the failure to do so
may invalidate any asserted public interest justification.
Second, locating participation rights in Article 23
broadens their scope and they would apply not only in
relation to activities that may affect or subordinate prop-
erty rights, but to any vested right. This builds on Sar-
ayaku, where the Court made clear that participation
rights extend beyond matters that only affect indigenous
lands; they also adhere to rights essential to their ‘sur-
vival as a people’, and the state must ‘ensure that the
rights of indigenous peoples are not ignored in any other
activity or agreement reached with private individuals,
or in the context of decisions of the public authorities
that would affect their rights and interests’.84 This
includes the adoption of legislation, in which case indig-
enous peoples ‘must be consulted in advance during all
stages of the process of producing the legislation, and
these consultations must not be restricted to propos-
als’.85 This is partly consistent with UNDRIP, Article
19, but omits its reference to consultation ‘in order to
obtain their free, prior and informed consent’ prior to
adopting and implementing legislative or administrative
measures. Grounding participation rights in Article 23
would thus appear to be a more generalised approach. It
is consistent with UNDRIP, Article 18, read into
ACHR, Article 23, by the Court, while the effective par-
ticipation safeguard retained in Article 21 reflects the
80. Yakye Axa v. Paraguay, above n. 40, at 148; accord Kaliña and Lokono
Peoples, above n. 1, at 196.
81. Kaliña and Lokono Peoples, above n. 1, 196. See also Garífuna Com-
munity of Punta Piedra v. Honduras, IACTHR (2015) Series C, No. 304,
168-73 (finding violations of property and participation rights in con-
nection with the establishment of a protected area).
82. See e.g. Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, above n. 22, at 212
(observing that ‘the ‘public interest’ test is met with a much higher
threshold in the case of encroachment of indigenous land rather than
individual private property’).
83. Clyde River (Hamlet) v. Petroleum Geo-Services [2017] SCC 40, at 70.
84. Sarayaku, above n. 28, at 167.
85. Id., at 181.
heightened attention required when indigenous lands
and resources may be affected, as provided by
UNDRIP, Article 32(2).86
Last but not least, the Court’s progressive jurisprudence
on reparations in the indigenous context deserves men-
tion. In general, the remedies ordered by the Court dis-
play an unprecedented sensitivity to indigenous peoples’
perspectives and a willingness to creatively interpret the
ACHR to protect the collective rights of indigenous
peoples.87 This includes the collective dimension of
harm suffered, both moral and material,88 and corre-
sponding measures of redress.89 It also includes the
identification of the victim(s) in collective terms; for
instance, in the case under discussion, the Court ‘con-
siders the Kaliña and Lokono peoples and their mem-
bers to be the injured party’.90 Article 40 of the
UNDRIP provides in this regard that indigenous people
have the right to ‘effective remedies for all infringe-
ments of their individual and collective rights’, which
shall ‘give due consideration to the[ir] customs, tradi-
tions, rules and legal systems…’. This general provision
is complemented by specific reparations language found
in various other articles (e.g. Articles 8, 12, 13 and 28).
As noted above in the context of ACHR, Articles 21 and
23, the Court’s approach to reparations is both conso-
nant with the UNDRIP and adds significant flesh to the
bare bones of its principles.
Prefacing its extensive reparations orders,91 the Court
explained in Kaliña and Lokono Peoples that ‘reparation
should help strengthen the cultural identity’ of the
indigenous peoples, ‘guaranteeing the control of their
own institutions, cultures, traditions and territories in
order to contribute to their development in keeping
with their life projects, and present and future needs’.92
Consequently, ‘the measures of reparation granted
should provide effective mechanisms, in keeping with
their specific ethnic perspective, that permit them to
define their priorities as regards their development and
evolution as a people’.93 It also quoted UNDRIP, Arti-
86. See also Kaliña and Lokono Peoples, above n. 1, at 305(d) (ordering
the State to establish effective mechanisms to guarantee effective par-
ticipation … in any project, investment, nature reserve or activity that
could have an impact on their territory’).
87. The Court, for instance, has repeatedly recognized the ‘importance of
taking into account certain aspects of the customs of the indigenous
peoples of the Americas for purposes of application of the American
Convention on Human Rights’. See e.g. Bamaca Velasquez v. Guatema-
la, IACTHR (2000) Series C, No 70, at 81; Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Ting-
ni v. Nicaragua, above n. 39, at 149; Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname,
IACTHR (1993) Series C, No 15, at 62; and Yakye Axa v. Paraguay,
above n. 48, at 63.
88. See e.g. Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, IACTHR (2004) Series
C, No 105, at 86 (observing that the proven facts demonstrated that
the Achí Mayan people’s identity and values were seriously affected
and, therefore, ‘a significant component of the remedy should be repar-
ations to the communities as a whole’); and Moiwana Village v. Suri-
name, above n. 6, at 201 (explaining that reparations ‘have special sig-
nificance … given the extreme gravity of the facts and the collective
nature of the damages suffered’).
89. See e.g. Citroni and Quintana, above n. 21, at 319.
90. Kaliña and Lokono Peoples, above n. 1, at 273.
91. Id., 273-316.
92. Id., at 272.
93. Id.
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cle 29(1), in its order requiring the establishment of a
‘development fund’.94 This development fund is to
serve
… as compensation for the pecuniary and non-pecu-
niary damage suffered by the Kaliña and Lokono,
including ‘harm to extremely representative values …
that have an impact on their cultural identity and on
the cultural heritage to be transmitted to future gen-
erations….95
In the same vein, in Saramaka People, the Court identi-
fied the absence of effective domestic remedies as a key
factor in awarding the Saramaka compensation for
moral damages. It stated that the evidence demonstrates
… the suffering and distress that the members of the
Saramaka people have endured as a result of the long
and ongoing struggle for the legal recognition of their
right to the territory they have traditionally used and
occupied for centuries … as well as their frustration
with a domestic legal system that does not protect
them against violations of said right … all of which
constitutes a denigration of their basic cultural and
spiritual values.96
Likewise, in Moiwana Village, the Court identified the
community’s forced displacement and prolonged sepa-
ration from its traditional lands as one of the three bases
for finding that Suriname had violated the right to men-
tal and moral integrity (ACHR, Article 5).97 This fig-
ured prominently in the Court’s determination of moral
and material damages,98 and the Court presumed mate-
rial harm, inter alia, because ‘their ability to practice
their customary means of subsistence and livelihood has
been drastically limited’.99
2.2 Concerns and Divergence: Survival and
Consent
The IACHR and IACTHR’s jurisprudence100 affirms
that indigenous lands are fundamental to indigenous
peoples’ cultural integrity and survival.101 This juris-
94. Id., at 296.
95. Id., at 295.
96. Saramaka People, above n. 22, at 200.
97. Moiwana Village v. Suriname, above n. 6, at 101, 102-3.
98. See also Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, IACTHR
(2006), Series C, No. 146 (on the relevance of territorial rights to imma-
terial damages).
99. Moiwana Village v. Suriname, above n. 6, at 186-7.
100. See e.g. Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, IACTHR
(2010) Series C, No. 214, at 157; and IACHR, Indigenous Peoples,
Afro-Descendent Communities, and Natural Resources: Human Rights
Protection in the Context of Extraction, Exploitation, and Development
Activities, OEA/Ser.L/V/II., Doc. 47/15 (2015).
101. See e.g. Sarayaku, above n. 28, at 146 (explaining that ‘the protection
of the territories … also stems from the need to guarantee the security
and continuity of their control and use of natural resources, which in
turn allows them to maintain their lifestyle. This connection between
territory and natural resources … is necessary for their physical and cul-
tural survival and the development and continuation of their world-
view…’); and Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, above n. 54, at 177
(stating that its consistent case law on indigenous matters ‘has recog-
nized that the relationship of the indigenous peoples with the land is
prudence additionally holds that certain restrictions on
or interferences with their property and associated
rights may be either ‘impermissible’102 or subject to
indigenous peoples’ free, prior and informed consent,
irrespective of any asserted public interest.103 The same
is also the case, inter alia, in the jurisprudence of the
Human Rights Committee.104
These considerations often provoke strong, negative
reactions from states, which assert that this grants indig-
enous peoples a right to halt national development proj-
ects or even, as Suriname protested in Kaliña and Loko-
no, to undermine the democratic will of the people of
the state. Nonetheless, the Court and other authorities
have recognised that majorities cannot simply override
the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples, even if
they do so via legislation that enjoys widespread public
support. For example, in Gelman v. Uruguay – concern-
ing a broadly supported ‘amnesty’ law – the Court
explained that ‘the protection of human rights consti-
tutes an impassable limit to the rule of the majori-
ty…’.105 There is also recognition of the majoritarian
biases inherent in the public interest doctrine.106
This basic limit is repeatedly referenced in the Court’s
indigenous jurisprudence, which explicates that state-
initiated or authorised projects and investments107 ‘can-
not negate the very survival of the members of the
indigenous and tribal peoples’.108 In Saramaka and
progeny,109 the term ‘survival’ is defined to mean indig-
essential for maintaining their cultural structures and for their ethnic and
material survival…’).
102. Saramaka People, above n. 22, at 128 (the State may restrict the Sara-
makas’ right to use and enjoy lands and resources ‘only when such
restriction complies with the aforementioned requirements and, addi-
tionally, when it does not deny their survival as a tribal people’).
103. Id., 134.
104. See e.g. CCPR/CO/69/AUS (2000), at 10-11; accord, Bernard Omi-
nayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band vs. Canada, A/45/40, vol. 2
(1990); Apirana Mahuika, above n. 41; and Angela Poma Poma v.
Peru, CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006 (2009).
105. IACTHR (2011) Series C, No. 221, at 239.
106. See e.g. CERD/C/IDN/CO/3 (2007), at 17 (observing that the rights of
indigenous peoples have been compromised ‘due to the interpretations
adopted by the State party of national interest, modernization and eco-
nomic and social development;’ and recommending that Indonesia
ensure that these concepts ‘are defined in a participatory way, … and
are not used as a justification to override the rights of indigenous peo-
ples’); and Report of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural
Rights, A/70/279 (2015), 44 (referring to UNDRIP, Art. 46(2) – con-
taining the grounds for limitations on rights – and concluding that such
‘limitations can be problematic, however, if they are justified by refer-
ence to the interest of a mainstream society that otherwise does not
recognize indigenous interests. In such cases, limitations can be misused
to the detriment of indigenous communities’).
107. Saramaka People, above n. 22, footnote 127 (defining ‘development or
investment plan’ to mean ‘any proposed activity that may affect the
integrity of the lands and natural resources within the territory of the
Saramaka people, particularly any proposal to grant logging or mining
concessions’).
108. Id. at 128; accord Angela Poma Poma v. Peru, above n. 104, at 7.6
(States parties ‘must respect the principle of proportionality so as not to
endanger the very survival of the community and its members’).
109. See e.g. Garífuna Community of Punta Piedra v. Honduras, above n.
81, 167. See also Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, above n. 54, at
160; Moiwana Village v. Suriname, above n. 6, at 101, 102-3 (observ-
ing that: ‘in order for the culture to preserve its very identity and integ-
rity, [indigenous and tribal peoples] … must maintain a fluid and multi-
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enous and tribal peoples’ ‘ability to “preserve, protect
and guarantee the special relationship that they have
with their territory”, so that “they may continue living
their traditional way of life, and that their distinct cul-
tural identity, social structure, economic system, cus-
toms, beliefs and traditions are respected, guaranteed
and protected”’.110 Additionally, the Court has ruled
that states must assess the ‘cumulative impact of exist-
ing and proposed projects’ because this allows for ‘a
more accurate assessment on whether the individual or
cumulative effects of existing or future activities could
jeopardize the survival of indigenous or tribal people’.111
The Court’s above-stated jurisprudence is largely con-
sistent with UNDRIP, Article 8, which, in connection
with the right ‘not to be subjected to forced assimilation
or destruction of their culture’, provides that states shall
effectively prevent and provide redress for: ‘(a) Any
action which has the aim or effect of depriving [indige-
nous peoples] of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of
their cultural values or ethnic identities; [and] (b) [a]ny
action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them
of their lands, territories or resources…’. Other provi-
sions are also directly implicated (e.g. UNDRIP, Arti-
cles 11–13, 20, 23–25, 31, and 32(1)). As many interven-
tions on indigenous lands also involve constructive
removal from the land – as opposed to relocation via a
formal process – Article 10 is also relevant, requiring
that no relocation shall take place without free, prior and
informed consent. Likewise, the UN Special Rappor-
teur on adequate housing identified UNDRIP, Article
7,112 as a ‘rich source for understanding the right to life
and the right to adequate housing in international
human rights law’.113 She further observed that the
‘development and application of these rights has the
potential to enhance the understanding of the social
dimensions of the right to life and the interplay between
the collective and individual dimensions of that right; it
may also prompt a response to violations of rights to
lands, territories or resources’.114 Unfortunately, no fur-
ther explanation was provided about this premise or the
interplay between the collective and individual dimen-
sions of the right.
dimensional relationship with their ancestral lands’); and Yakye Axa v.
Paraguay, above n. 40, at 146, (where the Court observes that ‘indige-
nous territorial rights encompass a broader and different concept that
relates to the collective right to survival as an organized people, with
control over their habitat as a necessary condition for reproduction of
their culture, for their own development and to carry out their life aspi-
rations’).
110. Saramaka People, above n. 22, 129-34 and; Saramaka People v. Suri-
name, above n. 41, at 37.
111. Saramaka People, above n. 22, at 41.
112. UNDRIP, Art. 7, reads: ‘1. Indigenous individuals have the rights to life,
physical and mental integrity, liberty and security of person. 2. Indige-
nous peoples have the collective right to live in freedom, peace and
security as distinct peoples and shall not be subjected to any act of gen-
ocide or any other act of violence, including forcibly removing children
of the group to another group’.
113. Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Stand-
ard of Living and on the Right to Non-Discrimination in this Context,
A/71/310 (2016), at 56.
114. Id.
As a more general point, these and other standards rec-
ognise that effective guarantees for indigenous peoples’
traditionally owned territories, including the right to
control internal affairs and participate in external activi-
ties affecting them through their own institutions,
underpin indigenous peoples’ identity, integrity and
survival. There is therefore a complex of interdependent
human rights115 converging on and inherent to indige-
nous peoples’ various relationships with their traditional
lands and territories as well as their interrelated status as
self-determining entities, all of which necessitates a high
standard of affirmative protection.116
These issues were very relevant in Kaliña and Lokono
given the scale and cumulative impact of the nature
reserves, mining and logging operations, and individual
titles, which cumulatively affect the vast majority of
their territory. The Kaliña and Lokono peoples are
severely restricted in and, in some cases, denied their
ability to preserve their relationships with their territory
and to maintain their traditional way of life in the vast
majority thereof. This even extends to the core residen-
tial areas of their villages, which have been issued to and
fenced-off by third parties for use as vacation homes!
In its judgment, the Court determined that the proven
violations had resulted in ‘harm to extremely represen-
tative values of the [Kaliña and Lokono] … that have an
impact on their cultural identity and on the cultural her-
itage to be transmitted to future generations’.117 It
observed more specifically that ‘the extraction of bauxite
… resulted in serious damage to the environment and to
the natural resources necessary for [their] survival and
development’,118 and ‘the negative effects have contin-
ued over time, thus affecting the traditional territory
and the means of survival of the members of these peo-
ples’.119 During the Court’s on-site visit in August 2015
it saw for itself that ‘the [mined] area had clearly been
115. See H. Quane, ‘A Further Dimension to the Interdependence and Indivi-
sibility of Human Rights? Recent Developments Concerning the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples’, 25 Harvard Human Rights Journal 49, at 51
(2012) (analysing United Nations’ treaty body practice ‘concerning the
rights of indigenous peoples, which suggest[s] a further dimension to
the interdependence and indivisibility of human rights. These develop-
ments suggest that human rights are interdependent and indivisible not
only in terms of mutual reinforcement and equal importance, but also in
terms of the actual content of these rights’) (footnote omitted). See also
e.g. Xákmok Kásek v. Paraguay, above n. 100, at 263, and Río Negro
Massacres v. Guatemala, above n. 54, at 143-44 (both relating territori-
al rights to the rights of the child).
116. See inter alia Maya Indigenous Communities and their Members v.
Belize, IACHR, Case 12.053 (2003), 111-19, 141; CCPR/CO/69/AUS
(2000), 10-11; and; G. Handl, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Subsistence Life-
style as an Environmental Valuation Problem’, in M. Bowman and A.
Boyle (eds.), Environmental Damage in International and Comparative
Law. Problems of Definition and Valuation (2002), at 95 (asserting
‘there can be little room for doubt that there exists today a general con-
sensus among states that [indigenous peoples’] cultural identity … war-
rants affirmative protective measures by states, and that such measures
be extended to all those elements of the natural environment whose
preservation or protection is essential for the groups’ survival as cultur-
ally distinct peoples and communities’).
117. Kaliña and Lokono peoples, above n. 1, at 295.
118. Id., at 217
119. Id., at 222.
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damaged and the landscape altered radically’.120 It ruled
in this respect that the state had violated the victims’
rights to collective property, cultural identity121 and
participation in public matters.122 Note in this regard
that, in Sarayaku, the Court observed that respect for
the right to consultation of indigenous peoples ‘is pre-
cisely recognition of their rights to their own culture or
cultural identity … which must be assured, in particu-
lar, in a pluralistic, multicultural and democratic soci-
ety’.123
Leaving aside the equation of recognition of rights to
culture or to cultural identity with the right to consulta-
tion, not the least as the latter would not seem, by itself,
to ensure the substantive guarantees inherent in said
rights, the Court could have found that the proven acts
and omissions do, as a matter of fact and law, ‘negate the
very survival’ of the Kaliña and Lokono, and therefore,
that the impugned activities were impermissible. It
could have plausibly done so in relation to the bauxite
mining alone based on its factual findings. Cumulative-
ly, the facts of the case strongly support finding that the
activities in question do threaten, and likely also negate,
the Kaliña and Lokono’s ‘ability to “preserve, protect
and guarantee the special relationship that they have
with their territory”, so that “they may continue living
their traditional way of life, and that their distinct cul-
tural identity, social structure, economic system, cus-
toms, beliefs and traditions are respected, guaranteed
and protected”’, the ultimate purpose of the protections
specified by the Court.
However, despite being extensively briefed by the Kali-
ña and Lokono, these issues are not analysed or other-
wise adequately addressed in the judgment. The Court,
for example, could have concluded that the activity or
activities did not rise to the requisite level (e.g. finding
that serious and enduring damage to natural resources
necessary for survival and development and inter-gen-
erational harm to the cultural identity of the Kaliña and
Lokono does not pass the threshold), but this point was
not explicitly addressed. The redress provided for the
120. Id., at 220.
121. Sarayaku, above n. 28, at 217 (explaining that ‘the right to cultural
identity is a fundamental right – and one of a collective nature – of the
indigenous communities, which should be respected in a multicultural,
pluralistic and democratic society. This means that States have an obli-
gation to ensure that indigenous peoples are properly consulted on
matters that affect or could affect their cultural and social life, in
accordance with their values, traditions, customs and forms of organiza-
tion’).
122. Kaliña and Lokono peoples, above n. 1, at 198 (finding these violations
to have been caused ‘mainly by preventing their effective participation,
and the access to part of their traditional territory and natural resources,
in the Galibi and Wane Kreek nature reserves, as well as by failing to
guarantee, effectively, the traditional territory of the communities that
has been affected by the environmental degradation within the
WKNR’). See also Sarayaku, above n. 28, at 218-20, at 220 (where the
Court ‘considers that the failure to consult the Sarayaku People affected
their cultural identity, since there is no doubt that the intervention in
and destruction of their cultural heritage entailed a significant lack of
respect for their social and cultural identity, their customs, traditions,
worldview and way of life, which naturally caused great concern, sad-
ness and suffering among them’).
123. Id., at 159.
serious pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, taken
together with the Court’s reasoning and other orders,
may allow some conclusions to be drawn implicitly, but
this provides very little assistance to states or indigenous
peoples about the parameters within which rights
should be recognised, respected and protected or how
projects and investments should be assessed and permit-
ted. This is all the more disturbing given the hotly con-
tested nature of many of these issues.
Patrick Macklem has correctly observed in this
regard that the more specific the descriptions inter-
national law offers of what changes are needed in
domestic law, the more the intervention translates
relatively abstract international human and indige-
nous rights into concrete legal entitlements cogniza-
ble to the domestic legal order in question in a pro-
grammatic way….124
The Court’s approach in Kaliña and Lokono not only
fails in this test, it also risks relegating the Court’s self-
designated ultimate purpose (ensuring survival as
defined above) for the various protective measures to lit-
tle more than rhetoric. The same may also be said for
equating rights protection with consultation or partici-
pation but not analysing or requiring consent; the latter,
assuming it is implemented properly, being a funda-
mentally more effective means by which indigenous
peoples can protect the substantive guarantees that are
usually threatened by extractive, conservation and other
projects.
Moreover, this equation of rights protection with con-
sultation generally leads the Court to emphasise proce-
dural guarantees at the expense of fully contemplating
and ruling on substantive guarantees and violations
thereof. This is especially troubling as consultation pro-
cesses are often deeply flawed and, if they happen at all,
the inequality of arms between states, corporations and
indigenous peoples is conspicuous and often debilitat-
ing. This focus also does little to prevent future viola-
tions as the various judgments tend to revolve around
state compliance with procedures, rather than, as Mack-
lem observes above, providing specific analysis of rights
in a way that makes them cognisable to the domestic
legal order and authorities ‘in a programmatic way’. It
also results in an undue emphasis on permissible restric-
tions to rights, rather than focusing on the content of
those rights, which brings to mind Yash Gai’s comment
that ‘rights are struggling to stay afloat in the sea of
exceptions (and alas not always succeeding!)’.125
Turning to consent, in Saramaka, the Court held that
the effective participation standard includes consent
when a large-scale project or projects, separately or
cumulatively, ‘would have a major impact’ on traditional
124. Paper by Professor Patrick Macklem, UN Seminar on Access to Justice,
cited in Access to Justice in the Promotion and Protection of the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples, A/HRC/24/50 (2013), at 18, footnote 19.
125. Y. Ghai, ‘The Kenyan Bill of Rights: Theory and Practice’, in P. Alston
(ed.), Promoting Human Rights through Bills of Rights: Comparative
Perspectives (1999), at 197.
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territory.126 Nonetheless, in Kaliña and Lokono, the
Court maintains its post-Saramaka trend of minimising
or omitting any discussion of the consent requirement,
emphasising only the (albeit considerably strengthened)
consultation aspects of effective participation.127 In its
2013 decision on the merits in Kaliña and Lokono, the
IACHR observed that the mining operations at issue
certainly triggered the consent requirement.128 The
Court’s verification of the scale and impact of these
operations should have prompted it to assess, or at least
acknowledge, consent, even if it then relied on the lack
of consultation as reason for not analysing its applicabil-
ity.129 It not only failed to do so, it even omitted the
word ‘consent’ when quoting Article 32(2) of the
UNDRIP in the relevant section of the judgment.130
This is troubling to the say the least in light of the
repeated affirmation of consent – as an attribute of
indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination – by UN
treaty bodies and others. Ironic also, given that the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
routinely cites consent as being required under Article 1
of the Covenant131 and the Court has twice held that it
cannot interpret the rights guaranteed to indigenous
peoples by the ACHR to a lesser extent than is recog-
nised in that same Covenant.132 Yet, this is precisely
what it did in Kaliña and Lokono.
3 Conclusion
The contemporary indigenous rights framework has
come into being via three main processes, all within the
126. Saramaka People, above n. 22, at 134, 137 and 147.
127. Sarayaku, above n. 28, at 177 (stating that it was unnecessary to assess
the consent requirement because the State had failed to consult);
accord Garifuna Community of Triunfo de la Cruz v. Honduras,
IACTHR (2015) Series C, No. 305, Garífuna Punta Piedra Community v.
Honduras, above n. 81.
128. Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v Suriname, IACHR, Case 12.639, above n.
3, at 155 (concluding that the bauxite mining in this case ‘is precisely
the type of activity that the Inter-American Court has stated should be
subject to consultations and consent of the affected indigenous peoples.
In Saramaka, the Court stated that “regarding large-scale development
or investment projects that would have a major impact within Saramaka
territory, the State has a duty, not only to consult with the Saramaka,
but also to obtain their No consultation or consent of this type was con-
ducted or obtained in connection with the authorization of bauxite min-
ing operations inside the Wane Kreek Reserve’).
129. Sarayaku, above n. 28, 180 and footnote 237.
130. Kaliña and Lokono Peoples, above n. 1, at 202.
131. See e.g. E/C.12/PRY/CO/4, above n. 42, at 6 (citing Art. 1, and recom-
mending that Paraguay adopts ‘the legislative and administrative meas-
ures needed to ensure that free, prior and informed consent is obtained
from indigenous peoples in relation to decisions that may directly affect
the exercise of their economic, social and cultural rights’); and E/C.
12/AUS/CO/5 (2017), at 16(e) (citing Art. 1, and recommending that
Australia ensure that ‘free, prior and informed consent is incorporated in
the Native Title Act 1993 and in other legislation as appropriate, and is
fully implemented in practice’);
132. Saramaka People, above n. 22, 93; Kaliña and Lokono Peoples, above
n. 1, 122 and, at 124 (stating that ‘in this case, the right to property
protected by Article 21 of the [ACHR], and interpreted in light of the
rights recognized in Article 1 common to the two Covenants, … which
cannot be restricted when interpreting the American Convention…’).
context of highly effective advocacy by indigenous peo-
ples at the international (and, in some cases, domestic)
level. First, the interpretation of existing international
human rights norms in a way that is more responsive to
indigenous characteristics and needs. Second, the prom-
ulgation of specific international instruments, wholly or
partially, addressing indigenous rights, and within dif-
ferent fields of international law; and third, litigation
before international courts and quasi-judicial bodies.133
The above discussion of Kaliña and Lokono Peoples and
the UNDRIP indicates that these are not discrete cate-
gories, but, instead, operate in a dynamic state of inter-
play and, often, mutual reinforcement. This also affirms
that the UNDRIP is only one, albeit very important,
bright light in the firmament that ‘stretches well beyond
international legal regimes and into State and indige-
nous forums alike’.134
The Court is a leading actor in this process, as is the
IACHR, which first addresses and then brings cases to
the Court. Its judgments have incorporated, inter alia,
important elements of self-determination, including as
(inter)related with issues of legal personality and rights
to collective territory; some attributes of the right to
self-government via recognition of the right to control
territory and respect for indigenous institutions and
juridical and other procedures; effective participation in
external decision-making, including, in principle at
least, consent (itself an attribute of self-determination);
and ground-breaking collective reparations, including
detailed norms on restitution of lands, that strive to be
highly attuned to indigenous realities and concerns.
While it has a tendency to essentialise indigenous cul-
ture and rights, often over emphasising its perception of
‘traditional’, its detailed reasoning and associated orders
are remarkable.135 The same may also be said for the
Court’s consistent recognition of indigenous customary
law and its insistence that States respect indigenous
peoples’ ‘customs, traditions and land tenure sys-
tems’.136 This recognition of indigenous customary law
‘has afforded greater protection of indigenous property
rights, which are essential to self-determination, self-
governance, and continued cultural existence’.137
While only touched on above, Kaliña and Lokono also
illustrates how indigenous rights litigation may – and
often should – encompass different fields of internation-
al law, always with the aim of harmonising them with
human rights guarantees. The Court, for instance,
133. See e.g. R. Morgan, Transforming Law and Institution: Indigenous Peo-
ples, the United Nations and Human Rights (2011).
134. K. Carpenter and A. Riley, ‘Indigenous Peoples and the Jurisgenerative
Moment in Human Rights’, 102 California Law Review 173 (2014), at
175.
135. See e.g. Price, above n. 20, at 237-40, at 238 (observing ‘a disturbing
essentialist leaning in some of the Court’s reasoning;’ and pointing out
‘the fundamental tension that exists between ideas that undergird rele-
vant aspects of international human rights law and current ideas in
anthropology’).
136. Kaliña and Lokono Peoples, above n. 1, 139, footnote 178 (citing and
paraphrasing UNDRIP, Art. 26).
137. Carpenter and Riley, above n. 134, at 207. See also B. Tobin, Indige-
nous Peoples, Customary Law and Human Rights – Why Living Law
Matters (2014) (addressing these issues in detail).
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extensively cites international environmental law, read-
ing provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD) into its interpretation of the ACHR,138 and
stresses, as a general proposition, that ‘the rights of the
indigenous peoples and international environmental
laws should be understood as complementary, rather
than exclusionary, rights’.139 It is important to note that,
although the CBD purports to guarantee some indige-
nous rights, there is no corresponding enforcement
mechanism. The Court’s ruling provides an opportunity
to enforce some CDB provisions through the lens of the
ACHR.
One area where much greater attention is required is the
intersection between indigenous rights and trade,
investment and private sector operations.140 Even
though many of the cases resolved by the IACHR and
the Court have involved private sector entities, especial-
ly in the extractives sector, the role and potential liabili-
ty of the private sector has yet to be addressed. Kaliña
and Lokono Peoples has generated some interest with
respect to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights and this may be further developed in
future cases. However, other possible avenues also
require attention and strategic action.
In the first place, states have previously invoked bilater-
al and other investment or trade agreements to reject
increased regulation of transnational corporations oper-
ating on indigenous lands. Yet, the Court clearly held in
Sawhoyamaxa that such agreements are subordinate to
the ACHR, calling into question the legality of range of
prior expropriations of indigenous lands as well as the
activities now taking place on those lands.141 This is also
highly significant as the majority of loan agreements
between states and international financial institutions
(e.g. the World Bank Group) are classified as bilateral
treaties, and some of the projects carried out pursuant to
those agreements have had and continue to have severe,
negative human rights impacts on indigenous peoples.
Also, while not referenced by the Court in Sawhoya-
maxa, it is important to recall that Article 36 of the
Charter of the OAS provides that ‘Transnational enter-
prises and foreign private investment shall be subject to
the legislation of the host countries and to the jurisdic-
tion of their competent courts and to the international
treaties and agreements to which said countries are par-
ties….’ It would seem logical that the Court would
accord the same primacy to the ACHR in this context
138. Kaliña and Lokono Peoples, above n. 1, at 177 (quoting and incorpo-
rating Arts. 8(j) and 10(c) of the CBD).
139. Id., 173.
140. See e.g. Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council
on the rights of indigenous peoples on the impact of international
investment and free trade on the human rights of indigenous peoples,
A/70/301 (2015).
141. Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, above n. 98, at 140
(rejecting the argument that some of the lands in question were protec-
ted from expropriation by a trade agreement with Germany; making
clear that such agreements must always be interpreted consistently with
the ACHR’s guarantees and could not be invoked as grounds for non-
compliance with those guarantees (i.e. the restitution of indigenous
lands).
also, and this may provide a way of seeking to further
regulate the human rights conduct of both private sector
entities and host states.
Finally, it is trite to observe that there is a serious imple-
mentation gap in human rights law. This is also the case
for compliance with the Court’s judgments. While fur-
ther litigation is unlikely to address this perennial prob-
lem, the Court’s jurisprudence is nonetheless slowly and
surely having an impact on domestic tribunals and legis-
latures. The Constitutional Court of Colombia, for
example, routinely cites the Court as authority, includ-
ing in cases brought by indigenous peoples. Likewise,
the Caribbean Court of Justice accorded great weight to
the IACHR and Court’s jurisprudence in its landmark
2015 judgment in Maya Leaders Alliance v. A.G. Belize.
This judgment, which cited the UNDRIP and a range
of other international standards, upheld Maya custom-
ary land tenure rights as constitutionally protected
property.142 In doing so, the CCJ stressed that this was
demanded by the concept of the rule of law, which
‘encompasses the international obligations of the State
to recognize and protect the rights of indigenous peo-
ple’.143 It also emphatically declared that, today, it is
‘beyond dispute that international law recognizes and
protects the rights of indigenous peoples’.144 Times
have changed!
142. See also New Zealand Mãori Council et al v. A.G. et al, [2013] NZSC 6
(where the New Zealand Supreme Court relied on the UNDRIP in con-
struing the scope of Mãori rights to freshwater and geothermal resour-
ces).
143. Maya Leaders Alliance v. A.G. Belize, [2015] CCJ 15 (AJ), at 52.
144. Id., at 53.
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